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Abstract
A Keynesian idea of considerable historical importance is that, in the
presence of a liquidity trap, a competitive economy may lack——despite price
flexibility——automatic market mechanisms that tend to eliminate excess supplies
of labor. The standard classical counterargument, which relies upon the Pigou
effect, has typically been conducted in a comparative—static framework. But,
as James Tobin has recently emphasized, the more relevant issue concerns the
dynamic response (in "real time") of an economy that has been shocked away from
full employment. The present paper develops a dynamic analysis, in a rather
standard model, under the assumption that expectations are formed rationally.
The analysis permits examination of Tobin's suggestion that, because of expecta—
tional effects, such an economy could be unstable. Also considered is Martin
J. Bailey's conjecture that, in the absence of a stock Pigou effect, Keynesian
problems could be eliminated by expectational influences on disposable income.
Bennett T. McCallum





For several decades, students of macroeconomic theory have learned about the
"Keynes vs. the Classics" debate of the late 1930's and early 1940's. The basic
issue is beautifully summarized in James Tobin's recent Jahnsson lectures, as
follows. In the General Theory, Keynes "denies the existence of self—correcting
market mechanisms which would eliminate excess supplies of labor and other produc-
tive resources... in a competitive economy.... He does not say merely that this
process may take a very long time; he says that it does not work at all" (l980a,
pp. 1-2). Keynes's argument relies, as Tobin emphasizes, on "the possibility that
the full employment equilibrium real interest rate.. .isbelow zero" (p. 5) or below
some other floor resulting from the famous liquidity trap.1 "That is a possibility
which, it seems, cannot be excluded by a priori restrictions on technology and
taste" (Tobin, 1980a, p. 5).
The classical counterargument relies, of course, on the Pigou effect——on the
stimulus to aggregate demand that is provided by increases in aggregate private
wealth that result, given a constant nominal stock of outside money, from the
decline in the price level brought about by the excess supplies. Most writers
of textbooks, treatises, and articles have agreed that Pigou's argument (1943)
(1947) carried the day.2
Tobin (1975) (1980a) has emphasized, however, that the usual discussion takes
place in a comparative—static framework. But what is relevant, he suggests, is the
dynamic response of a system that has been shocked away from full employment.3 In
his words, "the question applies to real time and to sequential processes. There-
fore the static long—run 'Pigou effect' does not entitle anyone to give a positive
answer" to the question: "does the market economy, unassisted by government policy,
possess effective mechanisms for eliminating general excess supply of labor and
productive capacity?" (1980a, p. 18). Now this suggestion seems quite appropriate:—2—
the actual policy-relevant issue does concern the behavior of an economy astime
passes, not a comparison of static equilibrium positions.Thus discussions of
the latter would seem to miss the interesting point--implicit in the Keynes—
pigou dispute--almost entirely.
In his 1975 paper, Tobirt developed one dynamic analysis of the relevant
issue. The bulk of his discussion presumes, however, that critically important
expectations of future inflation rates conform to the adaptive expectations formula,
while the remainder of the discussion presumes extrapolation of current values of
the price level or inflation rate. Thus, expectations are not constrained, in
Tobin's analysis, to be rational, Consequently, it is possible that his results
are dependent upon the existence of some particular pattern of systematic and costly
4
expectational errors.
The main purpose of the present paper, accordingly, is to conduct a dynamic
'analysis of the workings of the Pigou effect, in an economy with a full—blown
liquidity trap, under the assumption of rational expectations. The analysisthere-
fore constitutes an alternative to that offered by Tobin. In addition, it provides
an answer to whether it is possible (with rational expectations) for full employment
to be attained despite a liquidity trap by way of flow effects on disposable income.
This possibility, which does not rely upon the Pigou effect, has been emphasized
by Martin J. Bailey (1971, pp. 79—80).
it should be stressed, before we begin, that interest in the issues under
consideration is not dependent upon any notion that John Maynard Keynes personally
believed that actual economies were likely to experience liquidity trap situations.
The issues have been, whatever Keynes wrote or failed to write, of great
importance in the development of economic theory and doctrine. That they were not
taken up in recent reviews by Lucas (1981) and Grossman (1982) is understandably
due to the preoccupation of those writers with more current matters. But prime
concern for topics of the day does not imply that a discussion of such historical
significance should be left in an unsatisfactory state.—3.-
II. Basic Specification
Given the purpose of this study, it would be desirable to use an analytical
framework——a model——that is reasonably orthodox, analytically tractable, and also
similar(except for its expectational behavior) to the one used by Tobin. Fortun-
ately,it willbe possible to satisfy all of these criteria to a considerable
extent,though some deviation from Tobin's specification of aggregate supply will
prove to be necessary.
The first main ingredient in our model is an aggregate demand function.
In his paper, Tobin (1975) posited that the real quantity demanded is negatively
related to the price level and positively related to both the expected inflation
rate and real output. In addition, he assumed that the rate of change of output
is positively dependent upon the difference between demand and output. So that
explicit solutions can be obtained, it will be useful to have discrete—time, log—
linearversionsof similar relations. Consider, then, the following equations:
(1) e
=b+bi[r —(Ep÷i




Heree,y,n', and Pt denote logarithmsof (aggregate) quantity demanded, output,
the (outside) money stock, and the price level——all for period t——while r is the
nominal rate of interest. Also, Etpt+i =E(p÷1Ic2)is the conditional expectation
E given the information set S, which includes values of all aggregate
variables in periods t, t—l Thus, Etpt+1 —Ptis the rationally expected
inflation rate. Finally, V is a serially uncorrelated stochastic disturbance.
Equation (1) can be thought of as a log—linear IS function in which consump-
tion plus investment demand is related to the real rate of interest, real money
balances, and real income. Government spending and tax variables are absorbed into
the constant term, b, as are other influences not germane to the issues at hard.—4—
Equation (2) may be viewed as reflecting adjustmentsof output, in response. to
supply—demand discrepancies, of the type posited byTobin.5 Alternatively, on
could suppose that output and quantity demanded are always equal, in which case
e
would be interpreted as the value toward which period t's quantity demanded,
adjusts.
In either case, since our concern is with a situation in which a liquidity
trap prevails and no policy responses are forthcoming, itis appropriate to treat
both rt and m in (1) asconstants.6 Then we can combine equations (1) and (2),
obtaining
= o+ i(Etp+i — +(m —p)+ 3t—l ÷
wheref3. =X(b0+ b1r)/$,= — Xb1/,2=Ab2/,
=(1—X)/,and v
with=1—
Ab3.We presume that 2 >0and >0.The main properties of
Tobin's demand function will then be duplicated if we also take >0.We shall
provisionally do so, but it should be noted that this condition might not hold.
As emphasized by Martin J. Bailey, there is an effect of expected inflation on
disposable income due to capital losses or gains on real money balances (1971,
pp. 79—80) that works in the opposite direction from the expected inflation com-
ponent of the real interest rate. Tobin assumes that the latter effect is
stronger; Bailey's argument carries no implication regarding relative magnitudes.
Some specification regarding aggregate supply is needed to complete the
model. The one used in Tobin's analysis7 is an accelerationist Phillips Curve
that relates the inflation rate linearly to the expected inflation rate (with a
coefficient of unity) and positively to the "Okun gap," output minus capacity
output. If it is the current output gap that is relevant, a log—linear version
could be written as
—nt—i
=i(y—)+Et...i(pt — +U r>0,—5—
where U is another serially uncorrelated stochastic disturbance. An equation of
this form is, as many authors have noted, formally equivalent to the "Lucas supply
function" used by Sargent and Wallace (1975) in their well—known paper. Thus (4)




whereu= -u" is also a white noise disturbance. Thus,it is apparent that the
use of this equation, which implies that prices are fully adjustable within each
period, is to some extent not in the spirit of Tobin's "Keynesian version of price
dynamics" (1975, p. 198). On the other hand, it could be argued that a "classical"
specification is in fact appropriate for the supply portion of the model, since
Keynes's contention was that automatic adjustments to aggregate demand will not
take place in a liquidity trap situation even in a purely competitive, flexible—
price economy. In any event, we shall begin our analysis with a generalization
of (5) and then go on, in a later section, to consider alternative specifications
that imply less complete price flexibility.
Given, then, that we are going to begin with a version of (5)letus adopt
a generalization in which the previous output gap appears as an additional
explanatory variable, as follows:
(6). yt—
=a1(p
—Eip)+ c2(yi—Y)+u a1 >0
l>a2>O.
Here the presence of — yand the magnitude of a2 may be justified by the exis-
tence of adjustment costs——resource losses brought about by changes in the rate of
output. For a detailed discussion in the context of a rational expectations model,
see Sargent (1979,ch.16).8—6—
Jil. Analysis
We now turn to consideration of the dynamic behavior of y and p in the
model described by equations (3) and (6) plus the assumption of rational expecta-
tions. We begin by solving for the values of the "undetermined coefficients" in
the reduced—form equations:
(7a) = + + irv +
(7b) Pt =2O+ 2lt—l + 22t +
Once these values are obtained, we will easily be able to consider whether or not
the implied behavior for output is such that y tends automatically to approach
y as time passes——i.e., whether the system is stable. Also, an issue of the deter—
minacy of Pt will arise.
The first step is to note that
(8) Etpt+lr20 +
=
2O+ 2l iOlit—i ÷ir12v+ 1r13u).
Then substituting (7a), (7b), and (8) into (3) we obtain
(9)lO + llt—l + l2t + l3t =8o
+ + 2llO + 1ltl + 12v + 13u)}
+ 2)N20+1y1 + 22v + 23u] ÷2m+ 3t1 + v.—7—
But.forthis to hold for all realizations •of the exogenous disturbances, the
coefficientsmust satisfy the following identities:




















l3 = + 1—8—
The eight identities in (10) and (12) can be solved for the reduced—form coefficients
lO'"' 23
Rather than clutter the page with the resulting expressions, let us
note the features that are significant for our present investigation.
First, the role of the real—balance term 132(m —in(3) is crucial. To
to be explicit, if we had 2 =0then the coefficient 2O would fall out of the
first identity in (10) and would then appear in none of the equations in (10) or
(12). Thus, in this case the value of 2O would not be pinned down by the model;
the price level would be indeterminate. Furthermore, the first of equations (10)
and (12) would each determine (since 2l is given by the second pair) a value for
lO and there is nothing in the model to make these values coincide. So there is an
internal inconsistency in the model if the real—balance term does not appear. These
problems disappear, however, if 2 + Thisis the analytical counterpart in the
present analysis of Pigou's contention.
Next, the solution for output implied by (10) and (12) when 2 +0is of the
form
(13) = a2y—) +,
where is a serially uncorrelated linear combination of u and v. Thus, with
1a21 < 1.0, the behavior of output will be dynamically stable.1° In particular, if
0 < 2 < 1, as adjustment—cost considerations suggest, the system will be such thaty
tends to,return to y after being driven away by a disturbance (u or vt). In this
case the system behaves sensibly and in a manner consistent with the usual compara-
tive—static story.11
In fact, there is no absence of self—correcting market mechanisms even
2 < 0; even if, that is, aggregate demand is smaller with a lower price
level——perhaps because of distributional effects of the type emphasized by Tobin— 9-.
(1980a, pp. 9—11).In this model with a relatively "classical" supply function,
the role of the Pigou effect has to do only with existence, not stability, of
equilibrium.
Finally, let us consider what the present model has to say regarding Bailey's
(1971, p. 80) suggestion that liquidity trap problems may be eliminated by the
effect of expected deflation on disposable income. Since this argument pertains
to an economy with no Pigou effect, it might appear that the appropriate way to
represent Bailey's case would be with ]<0 and 2=0 If that were correct, his
suggestion would fail since Pt IS undetermined and overdetermined when I2=0.
But in fact 2=0 is not implied by Bailey's argument: since the effect in question
works by way of capital gains on real money balances, the relevant underlying
variable involves the product of expected inflation and real balances.For this
variable to be represented in our linearized model,therefore, additional terms
in m - andEtpt÷i - wouldhave to be added to equation (1). But if that
were done, the absence of a Pigou effect would not imply2 =0in equation (3):
the variable m -pwould enter nevertheless to reflect the capitalgains effect.
Thus, it seems that the system described by Bailey is well-behavedwhen aggregate
supply behavior is represented by the Lucas supply function(6).—10—
IV. Alternative Specification
Let us now consider some potential alternative specifications for aggregate
supply, ones that feature less price level flexibility than (6). The first that
comes to mind is a modification of the accelerationist Phillips Curve (4) in which
it is the lagged output gap that exerts pressure on the rate of price change, as in
(14) Pt 1_l =t—l
—+ Ei(p— +U.
This specification is perhaps more in the spirit of Tobin's suggestion——see his
equation (2.2.1). Unfortunately, it carries an implication that makes it, under
rational expectations, more classical in effect than (6). To see this, apply the
conditional expectation operator Ei()to (14) and note that the result is
(15) 0 =t—l
—
Thus,if y>O, as assumed, equation (14) implies that =yfor all t; i.e.,
that output always precisely equals the full—employment value. To find a formula-
tion that expresses an interesting alternative, we must therefore look elsewhere.









(18) Pt —t—l63t —'—) +-P11—
In these, 5. >0while the are white noise disturbances, i =1,2,3.Equation
(16) is of course a relation of the 11naive Phillips Curve variety while (17) is
J
(with E w. =1.0)one type of an accelerationist Phillips Curve and (18)—-jn
j=l
•
which Pt denotes the price level that would equate aggregate demand in t to
——is closely related to the specification of the MPS model.12 None of these speci-
fications is attractive, however, for each is inconsistent with the widely—accepted
notion that cannot be kept permanently high by any aggregate demand policy.13
That this is the case for (16) is obvious. The same is true for (17) when =1.0
and w.0 for j >1; then an inflation rate that increases by the amount s2 per
period will keep y —yfluctuating around .Moregenerally, (17) implies that




Finallyweturn to (18). Given the aggregate demand function (6), p is
definedas





Substitutioninto (18) then yields
(22) Pt -t—l
=31+ 82) -y)+ 3t - +—12--
which amounts to a minor modification of (16). Again a steady inflation will keep
output high.
There are, no doubt, other specifications worthy of consideration, but it
would be impossible to discuss all of them. Let us turn, accordingly, to one
that involves a certain amount of price inflexibility without carrying the impli-
cation that demand policy can keep output permanently high. The specification
in question, which has been previously used by Barro and Grossman (1976), McCallum
(1980), and Mussa (1981), is as follows:
(23)Pt t—l ='t—l
—y)+ Ei(p t—1 + u
y >0.
Herethereis but one difference from (14): it is the expected inflation rate for
the full—employment price level, p, rather than for p, that matters. Thus, (23)
should have the same sort of general properties as (14), but does not share the
undesirable implication expressed in (15).
A few words concerning (23) are perhaps in order. First, note that by using
(21) above, (23) could alternatively be written as
(23') Pt —Pti
="l+ t—1 — +Ei(p —t—1+ u.
In this version one can see that, as stated by Barro and Grossman, "price djustment
results from the summation of two component forces: first, an attempt to correct
any, existing discrepancy between the current values [of p and and, second, an
attempt to anticipate and prevent any potential future discrepancies" (1976, pp.
178—9).
Besides this appeal to plausibility, are there other justifications for
equation (23)? Mussa (1981) has attempted to rationalize an equivalent continuous——13—
time specification in terms of profit maximizing behavior by firms that incur
significant lump—sum costs from changing prices, while McCallum (1980) has pro-
posed an alternative rationale that appeals to optimizing behavior on the part
of worker—firm agents that experience employment adjustment costs and must set
prices in advance. These arguments are open to certain objections,14 but never-
theless seem to place (23) on a firmer basis than most sticky—price specifications.
Accordingly, let us now consider the dynamic behavior of output in a model con-
sisting of equations (3) and (23), with rational expectations.
The first step is to rearrange (23) as follows:
(24) Pt — = "— —+ 1_ — +u.
Next, from equation (20) and its counterpart with and y in place of
and y, we note that
(25) Pt —Etlt
=l+ z)[i(Etp+i —Etip+i)+ v — —
Using(25) and (21) in (24) then yields, after rearrangement,15
(26) yt —= —+1(Ep÷i —E1+1 + v —( +
where 1 —y(1+
As in the analysis in Section III, solutions fory and Pt will be of the
form (7) while Etpt+i is again representable by (8). Reference to (8) shows, more-
over, that E =7T20 +21lo + rry so we easily obtain—14—
(27) EtPt÷l
=21(12vi3u).







The identities implied by the demand portion of the model remain the same as
before, so the relevant conclusions can be drawn from equations (7), (10), and
(28).
In several ways, these conclusions are as in Section III. Again, if
=0——ifthe Pigou and capital gains effects are absent ——therewill be no
solution for r20 and two for r10,so again the price level will be undetermined
and output overdetermined by the model.
Again, furthermore, output relative to capacity obeys a first—order auto-
regressive process, in this case
(29) = — +
with white noise. But now dynamic stability depends upon the magnitude of
=1—y(1
2' rather than a2. Let us first consider the standard case,in
which and 2' as well as y, are positive. Given the formof,thesesign
conditions alone do not indicate whether stability will prevail. But the—15—
Parametersaresuch that coherent thought about their quantitative magnitudes
is possible. Let us suppose that the model's time periods correspond to quarter—
years. Then the magnitude of y and will be very small, in comparison to 1.0,
so will almost certainly be a positive fractioJ6——which, of course, implies
that y is stable and tends to approach y as time passes. Since the model is
not recursive, Pt will therefore also be stable.
If either or is negative, however, it is possible that their sum will
be negative, in which case 4 will exceed 1.0 and the system will be unstable.
In the present context it is worth noting that both Tobin and Bailey have suggested
that 2 might not be positive ——becauseof distributional effects (Tobin) or the
dominance of capital gains over Pigou effects (Bailey). Thus, these suggestions
give some impetus to the idea that instability might prevail. But given the
widely—held belief that distributional, wealth, and capital—gains effects are
all quantitatively minor, it seems likely that the sign of + 82 will be deter-
mined by 81 and that will be positive because of the depressing effect of the
real interest rate on aggregate demand. All in all, then, the analysis of this
section provides little support for the idea that instability would prevail if
aggregate supply were not perfectly classical.—16—
V. Conclusion
Our results can be briefly summarized as follows. In a macroeconomic
model with a liquidity trap, a Lucas—type "classical" aggregate supply function,
and rational expectations, the system is well—behaved and dynamically stable if
either the Pigou effect or the capital—gains effect of expected inflation on dis-
posable income is present. If both are absent, the model fails to determine the
price level and is internally inconsistent. If the Lucas—type supply function
is replaced with a "disequilibrium" specification that relates price changes to the
previous level of excess demand and to the expected change in the full—employment
price level, the system is again determinate if the Pigou or capital—gains effect
is operative.In this case dynamic stability cannot be guaranteed but instability
seems rather unlikely.Re ferences
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1. There is a second strand to the discussion in the General Theory that stresses
the importance of unions, relative wage concerns by individuals, and generally
the fact that money wages are set in a non—auction marketplace. But, as Tobin
points out, this strand "serves better to emphasize the difficulty and slowness
of melting frozen wage levels or wage—increase patterns than to establish that
they never melt at all" (p.3). It does not buttress Keynes's truly radical claim,
that there is no automatic tendency for full employment to be restored even .if
wages do adjust.
2.See, for example, Blaug (1968, p.648) Gordon (1981, pp. 160—3), Sargent (1979,
pp. 63—65), and Patinkin (1959) (1965). These authors mention, but do not
emphasize, the dynamic considerations with which the present paper is concerned.
3. The discussion here, and in what follows, is not meant to imply that the
"full employment" rate of employment or output is constant, smoothly growing, or
clearly discernable to econometricians. It might be better to use the term "mar-
ket—clearing," as in Barro and Grossman (1976). This paper will, however, retain
the more traditional terminology.
4. For discussions of the desirability of using rational expectations in macro-
economic analysis, see Lucas (1975) and McCallum (1980).




— rather than (1). It seems inappropriate, however, to
make output in a period independent of that period's demand influences.
6. This treatment is consistent with Tobin's (1975).
7. Reference is to Tobin's WPK model, not his M model, as the former is the one
that he presents as representing aspects of Keynes's theory and in which he detects
the possibility of dynamic instability of output.8. Tobiri (1980b) is on record as objecting to the inclusion of lagged output
terms in equations like (6). Heisof course correct in claiming that the inclu—
sion has no relation (one way or the other) to rational expectations. Whether
it has "very thin intrinsic justification" (p. 791) is debatable. In what follows,
the exclusion of —ywould not alter the main theoretical conclusions but
would impart a characteristic to the model——absence of unemployment persistence——
that seems counterfactual.
9. This last conclusion is similar to those reached by Bailey (1971, pp. 51—54)
and Sargent (1979, p. 63) in static contexts.
10. The same is true for p. Since the model is not fully recursive, the auto-
regressive parts in ARNA representations are the same for both endogenous variables
and stability depends only upon the autoregressive components.
11. This statement ignores the possibility of "bubble" or "bootstrap" paths, involv-
ing solution equations more general in form than (7), that can occur in dynamic
models with rational or irrational expectations. The issues raised by this
possibility of multiple solutions are only weakly related to those of concern in
the present paper. For an extensive discussion, see McCallum (1981).
12. On this point, see McCallum (1979).
13. The following discussion presumes that demand management (monetary and fiscal
policy) can be used to generate arbitrary price level paths.
14. The assumptions in McCallum (1980), for example, imply that it is prohibitively
costly to change prices within a period, but relatively costless to do so across
periods. In addition, it presumes that period length is determined exogenously.
15. Unlike the analogous equation (25) in McCallum (1980), expression (26) does
not support the controversial "policy ineffectiveness" proposition: monetary policy
rules may affect the magnitude of 2l in (27) below and thereby the variance of
—y.This difference results from differing assumptions regarding informationtvailable to agents in forming expectations about that are relevant to
perceptions of the real interest rate. For some discussion of the relevant
issue, see McCallum (1980, pp. 736—8).
16. Even if the time periods are years, the values of y and will be small
relative to 1.0. A value for y of 0.1, for example, reflects the well—known
rule—of—thumb that "the cost of a 1 point reduction in the basic inflation rate
is 10 percent of a year's GNP"(Okun,1978, p. 348). While rational expectations
analysis leads one to doubt the validity of Okun's estimate of the unemployment
costs of a policy change, it does not suggest that the implied "estimate" ofy is
seriously wrong.